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THE PEOPLE V. MUNDO
(decided Nov. 19, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
In a 7-2 decision, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
appellate division's order upholding the conviction of the defen-
dant, Jose Mundo. The court found that the police had conducted
a lawful search of a car that the defendant was in during a traffic
stop, which yielded a kilogram of cocaine that was used as evidence
in the defendant's prosecution. The court concluded that the of-
ficers could have believed there was "'actual and specific' danger to
their safety," which justified the search of the car.
2
II. BACKGROUND
On July 19, 1997, two New York City police officers were on
patrol in Manhattan when they observed a vehicle with Florida li-
cense plates make a right turn at a red light.3 The officers at-
tempted to stop the vehicle by activating their lights. 4 After the
vehicle pulled over and the officers approached on foot, it pulled
away at a slow speed. 5 The officers returned to their patrol car, acti-
vated both their lights and sirens, and attempted to pull the vehicle
over for a second time. 6 Again, the vehicle pulled over and drove
away after the officers exited the patrol car.7 As the officers pur-
sued the vehicle for a third time, it nearly hit a pedestrian crossing
the street.8 The officers testified that during this period of time, the
defendant in the back seat turned and faced them.9 In addition, he
made suspicious motions as if he were hiding something. 10
1. 99 N.Y.2d 55 (2002).
2. Id. at 59 (quoting People v. Carvey, 89 N.Y.2d 707, 712 (1997)).
3. People v. Mundo, 99 N.Y.2d at 57.
4. Id.
5. People v. Mundo, 730 N.Y.S.2d 305, 306 (App. Div. 2001).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Mundo, 99 N.Y.2d at 57.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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The officers were ultimately successful in stopping the vehicle,
at which time the vehicle's occupants were directed to exit the vehi-
cle and were patted down."1 One officer entered the vehicle and
searched the area in the back seat, where it seemed the defendant
had hidden something. 12 Upon pulling down an armrest, the of-
ficer observed an access panel to the trunk and the strong odor of a
chemical compound used to "'cut' or 'cook' cocaine."' 13 The officer
then exited the vehicle and opened the trunk where he found al-
most one kilogram of cocaine.
1 4
At trial, the defendant made a motion to suppress the cocaine
found in the trunk of the vehicle. 15 The motion was denied and the
defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled sub-
stance in the first and third degrees. 16 He was sentenced to concur-
rent terms of 15 years to life and 6 to 18 years.'
7
The defendant appealed his conviction alleging that the of-
ficer's search violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights under the United States Constitution, as well as his rights
under Article 1, § 12 of the New York State Constitution.1 8 The ap-
pellate division affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that:
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, where
the car in which defendant was riding took an extraordi-
nary series of evasive actions as it was being pulled over
for running a red light, coupled with the defendant's fur-
tive activity in the back seat while eyeing the pursuing po-
lice car, the officers had actual and specific reason to
believe it to be a substantial likelihood that defendant
had secreted a weapon in that area, and were thus justi-
fied in performing a limited search of the area after re-
moving and frisking the passengers. 19






17. Mundo, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
18. Mundo, 99 N.Y.2d at 57.
19. Mundo, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
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The appellate division did, however, vacate the conviction of
the lesser charge. 20 The court found that since the lesser charge
"arose from possession of the same cocaine without any further ac-
tivity" dismissal of the lesser charge was in the interests ofjustice.
29
The defendant subsequently appealed the appellate court's de-
cision.2 2 The court of appeals addressed the propriety of the search
solely on the basis of state law, and dismissed the federal constitu-
tional claims as without merit.
23
III. DIscussIoN
The court first examined the officers' behavior and found that
there was a lawful traffic stop because the officers observed the vehi-
cle making an illegal turn. 24 In addition, the court determined that
the officers "were authorized to direct the driver and passengers to
exit the detained vehicle." 25 Therefore, at issue remained "whether
the officer could lawfully search a limited area of the backseat in
light of all the facts of [the] case."
2 6
The court began its analysis of this issue by looking to settled
law in this area. Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution
protects people against "unreasonable searches and seizures" of
their persons, homes and effects. 27 The relevant language of § 12 of
the New York State Constitution mirrors that of the Fourth Amend-
ment to United States Constitution. Despite the identical language
of the provisions, the interpretations of state and federal constitu-
tional rights have developed differently. The New York State Court
of Appeals addressed this divergence in People v. Torres.28
In Torres, the court held that a "police officer acting on reason-
able suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and on an articulable
basis to fear for his own safety may intrude upon the person or
personal effects of the suspect only to the extent that is actually
20. Mundo, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
21. Id.
22. Mundo, 99 N.Y.2d at 57.
23. Id. at 59.
24. Id. at 58.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
28. 74 N.Y.2d 224 (1989).
20031
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necessary to protect him from harm." 29 The court maintained that
an officer's "entry into a citizen's automobile and his inspection of
personal effects located within are significant encroachments upon
that citizen's privacy interests. '3 0 In reversing the indictment
against the defendant in Torres, the court found that there was no
basis for the officer "to reach into the car and remove the shoulder
bag, since its presence presented no immediate threat to the of-
ficer's safety" once the occupants had been removed from the car
and frisked. 31 The court noted that this provides more protection
than is afforded under the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Michigan v. Long.
3 2
In Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court held that it was per-
missible for officers to do a search of the entire passenger compart-
ment of a car when a protective search of the occupants was
justified.33 This decision was based on the theory that the suspect
would have access to the weapon immediately after the stop termi-
nated, and therefore, would be a threat to officers. In Torres, the
court of appeals rejected the rationale provided in Michigan v.
Long, stating that such a rationale allowed searches of the passenger
compartments to be 'justified purely on [a] theoretical basis. . . .34
However, despite this higher standard, the Torres court did state
that certain circumstances can lead to a "conclusion that a weapon
located within the vehicle presents an actual and specific danger to
the officer's safety sufficient to justify a further intrusion, notwith-
standing the suspect's inability to gain immediate access to that
weapon."
35
In People v. Carvey, the court reaffirmed its requirement of an
actual threat to justify a more intrusive search of the car.36 The
court required that the officers perceive "'an actual and specific
danger' to their safety"3 7 before proceeding to a protective search
of the passenger compartment when the suspect no longer has im-
29. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 226.
30. Id. at 230.
31. Id. at 227.
32. Id. at 226.
33. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
34. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 231 n.4.
35. Id.
36. People v Carvey, 89 N.Y.2d 707 (1997).
37. Id. at 712.
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mediate access to the area. In Carvey, the officers observed the de-
fendant place something underneath the seat during a lawful traffic
stop.38 Upon approaching the car, the officers noticed that the de-
fendant was wearing a bulletproof vest.39 The court found that the
defendant wearing a bulletproof vest combined with his suspicious
behavior was enough to cause the officers to believe there was 'an
actual and specific danger' to their safety.
40
In the present case, the court found that the evidence clearly
supported the "Appellate Division's conclusion that the officers
could reasonably have concluded that a 'weapon located within the
vehicle present[ed] an actual and specific danger to their safety.' ,41
The court noted that there had been a blatant disregard of the of-
ficers' lawful commands to pull over, an "obvious lack of concern
for the safety of others"42 by almost hitting a pedestrian, and furtive
movements by the defendant during the chase. 43 These factors
were sufficient cause for the officers to believe that the requisite
"actual and specific danger" to their safety was present.44
IV. DISSENT
In both the appellate division and court of appeals, forceful
dissents were written by jurists who rejected the majority's analysis
of these facts under the standard set forth in Torres. At the appellate
level, Judge Rosenberger of the First Department dissented from
the opinion of four of his fellow panelists. At the court of appeals,
Judge Ciparick, along with Chief Judge Kaye, also dissented from
the opinion of the court.
Judge Ciparick felt that the "record [was] insufficient to sup-
port the appellate division's finding that there was an 'actual and
specific danger' to officer safety."45 First, the dissent points out that
the entire encounter of the vehicle pulling away from the police
officers and the reckless driving only lasted one-half of a city
38. Id. at 709.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 712.
41. Mundo, 99 N.Y.2d at 59 (quoting People v. Carvey, 89 N.Y.2d 707, 712 (1997)).
42. Mundo, 99 N.Y.2d at 59.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (Ciparick, J. dissenting).
2003]
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block.46 The dissent also pointed out that the encounter never ex-
ceeded a top speed of 10 mph in the estimation of the officers.47
In terms of the appropriate test to apply, the dissent noted that
the decision in Torres was intended to "provid[e] New Yorkers with
greater constitutional protections than those afforded by the fed-
eral constitution. Specifically, building upon the bedrock of state
precedent, [the court] adopted a two prong test, and if satisfied,
justifies a limited intrusion into a suspect's vehicle."48 The dissent
further argued that although Torres set a rule that was more protec-
tive than the federal standard, it also allowed for an exception to
this rule. 49 Torres allowed searches when the officer reasonably be-
lieved "that a weapon within the vehicle presents an actual and spe-
cific danger to the officer's safety."50
The dissent stated that the 'actual and specific danger' stan-
dard was clarified in Carvey, which required that there be a "sub-
stantial likelihood that a weapon be present in the vehicle." 51 In
Carvey, this standard was satisfied because the defendant was wear-
ing a bulletproof vest, which the court believed indicated the defen-
dant was "ready and willing to use a weapon." 52
In the present case, the dissent felt that the behavior of the
defendant and his cohorts did not rise to the same level as the be-
havior of the defendant in Carvey. While noting that the behavior in
this case was "highly unusual and inherently suspicious,"5 3 the dis-
sent stated that the behavior "[did] not indicate a willingness, nor a
readiness, to act violently against the police. '54 Therefore, the dis-
sent contends that the actions of the defendant did not establish
that there was an "actual and specific danger" to the safety of the
officers.
46. Mundo, 99 N.Y.2d at 60.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 61.
50. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 231.
51. Mundo, 99 N.Y.2d at 61 (Ciparick, J. dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 63.
54. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its standard that
law enforcement searches of passenger compartment of vehicles
are justified when based on "actual and specific danger" to the
safety of the officers. Here, evasive driving maneuvers and furtive
movements by the defendant-passenger were enough to allow of-
ficers to reasonably conclude that there was an "actual and specific
danger" to their safety.
Christine Harrington

